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Abstract: Research question:  This study examines the liquidity reaction 
surrounding the standardization of trading board lot (STBL) event that was 
announced and implemented in 2003. Motivation: The STBL event called 
for a reduction in the trading lot size from 1000 and 200 units per lot to a 
uniform size of 100 units per lot. The event that affected 98% of Malaysian 
listed firms is claimed to have improved the market liquidity and increased 
trading activities. Hence, this study is motivated to examine the claim. Idea: 
Specifically, this study examines the liquidity effect surrounding the event 
announcement and implementation dates. We hypothesize that the STBL 
event has significant impact on market liquidity. Data: We have a sample of 
869 firms. February 5, 2013 is taken as the event announcement date. Since 
the STBL was implemented in three phases, we have three implementation 
dates that affected different groups of firms. Method/Tools: To begin with, 
this study examines the liquidity effect using an event study methodology, 
followed by cross-sectional regression analyses. Liquidity is measured by (1) 
volume turnover, (2) bid-ask spread, and (3) Amihud illiquidity ratio to 
gauge the impact of the new policy on the market. Findings: There is a 
significant liquidity deterioration following the announcement of STBL due 
to the lack of information content. However, the implementation leads to 
significantly higher volume turnover in the first stage, while the bid-ask 
spread is significantly narrower in the second stage. In the last stage, we find 
significant improvement in all three liquidity measures. This is driven by an 
optimistic market outlook inspired by the positive liquidity effects observed 
in the earlier stages. Contribution: The findings confirm the significantly 
higher trading activities after the implementations of STBL, which further 
contribute to the limited literature on the minimum trading unit. The 
reduction of trading lot size leads to greater trading volumes. Lastly, the 
outcome of this study can be used as a reference for the regulators in 
evaluating the effectiveness of current policies or formulating future 
regulations. 
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In 2003, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, KLSE (currently known as Bursa Malaysia) 
announced and implemented standard size of trading board lot, affecting stocks listed on its 
market. A board lot, also known as the minimum trading unit (MTU), is defined as the 
minimum number of shares per contract that is traded on a stock exchange1. Standardization 
of trading board lot (STBL) is a process of standardizing the size of shares per lot of a listed 
firm. The market microstructure reform sees a reduction in the unit of shares per lot from 
1000 and 200 units to a standard size of 100 units that was completed in three different 
stages. By reducing the lot size, KLSE aims to; (1) facilitate investment in high-quality 
stocks that are relatively expensive, (2) increase liquidity of the stock market, (3) reduce 
odd lot holdings, and (4) attract new investors to the stock market (Bursa Malaysia, 2003). 
Prior to the implementation of STBL, 98% of the stocks were traded in the multiple of 
1000 units per lot, and around 1% have a board lot size of 200 units. This regulatory change 
affected most of the listed firms on KLSE at that time. The standardization was 
implemented in three exclusive stages. The first stage took place on April 7, 2003, affecting 
all 289 firms on the Second Board including firms under the Practice Note 4 (PN4) 
condition.2,3  The second stage was completed on April 28, 2003, in which 106 firms on the 
Main Board under the Trading/Services sector started to trade using the new board lot size. 
The third stage was implemented on May 26, 2003, for the remaining 474 firms listed on the 
Main Board. 
The standardization does not change the existing shareholders’ net worth. The smaller 
lot size increases the number of shares outstanding one is holding, which is similar to a 
stock split practice (Ahn et al., 2014). For new investment, standardization reduces the 
minimum monetary value required to purchase one lot of shares. Post-STBL, investors are 
only required to incur one-tenth (1/10) or one-fifth (1/5) of the earlier cost. Ceteris paribus, 
the smaller cost per lot provides investors with greater diversification potential for a given 
amount of capital, especially the retail investors with limited financial resources. 
Investments in high-priced stocks also become more affordable after the standardization. 
For example, before standardization, an investor requires a minimum of RM10,000 to buy 
one lot of shares trading at RM10, but after standardization, the minimum cost is reduced to 
RM1,000. The lower costs and smaller lot size give greater flexibility to investors in 
managing their portfolios. 
This study investigates whether the objective to add liquidity to the stock market by 
reducing the lot size is achieved. Even though KLSE claims that trading volume increased 
significantly following the standardization practice, it has never been academically tested 
(Bursa Malaysia, 2003). Furthermore, using trading volume alone to represent liquidity 
would be partially accurate, as liquidity itself has many proxies and dimensions (Goyenko et 
al., 2009), which needs to be addressed accordingly. Therefore, this study examines the 
liquidity reaction upon the announcement and implementation of STBL using three different 
measures of liquidity – volume turnover (trading activity), bid-ask spread (information 
asymmetry) and Amihud illiquidity ratio (price impact). 
The standardization is a purely cosmetic event, and thus, its implementation should have 
no real effects on the market (Ahn et al.,2014). Large traders or institutional investors might 
 
1 We use the term board lot or lot size as they are more frequently used in Malaysia. Regardless. the term minimum 
trading unit is more common in academic literatures (see for example Ahn, 2014; Amihud et al., 1999; and 
Gozluklu et al., 2015).  
*Coresponding author:  
2 The Second Board has merged with the Main Board on 8 August 2009, known as Main Market. 
3 Practice Note 4 (PN4) of Bursa Malaysia refers to a list of financially distress listed firms. These firms are in poor 
financial condition, and thus, required to provide proposal to restructure or to revive the firms. 
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react indifferently towards the new lot size, as they would care less about the lower 
minimum capital required to invest in one lot of shares. Regardless, the cheaper cost post-
STBL might be attractive for small traders as it relaxes the monetary constraint they face 
before. Therefore, any significant market reaction observed surrounding the implementation 
dates might be driven by retail investors trading activities (Merton, 1987, Amihud et al., 
1999). Since the implementation process is completed in multiple stages affecting a unique 
set of stocks each time, we expect to see asymmetric reaction across each stage. 
Our results show that there is a distinctive negative trend across all three liquidity 
measures surrounding the STBL announcement day. The lack of information provided 
during the announcement concerning the details of the standardization process has left the 
market in shrouds. Investors are constrained from making informed decisions, and the 
pending information translates into significantly lesser trading activity, wider spreads, and 
greater illiquidity in the post-announcement period. 
The first stage of STBL implementation sees significantly more trading activities. 
However, the higher post-event Amihud illiquidity ratio suggest that even though the stocks 
are now more affordable, investors demand a higher return to compensate for the additional 
risk they have to bear by investing in the speculative stocks. In addition, the fact that this is 
an unprecedented event leads to the higher pre-event bid-ask spread, suggesting a greater 
dispersion of opinion across investors. 
The second stage shows that there is no significant effect on trading activities or price 
impact, potentially due to the characteristics of the underlying firms. The stocks in the 
Trading/Services sector inherently are highly liquid, and thus, results from the liquidity-
driven initiative are less apparent in these stocks. The smaller lot size post-standardization 
gives the small investors opportunities to impound their information in high-priced stocks. 
This leads to the significantly narrower post-STBL bid-ask spread which indicates less 
information asymmetry in the affected stocks. 
The third stage sees the completion of the standardization process, affecting the 
remaining Main Board firms. We find that there are significant liquidity improvements 
across all three liquidity measures. The design of STBL implementation which was 
completed in multiple stages gives investors opportunities to learn how the market would 
react from the earlier stages. The positive reactions observed in the prior stages create an 
optimistic view of the completion of the third stage, which explains the significant results 
obtained. This also motivates investors to take strategic positions in the market before the 
implementation date, evident by the abnormally high trading activities in the pre-event 
window. 
Our study contributes to the body of knowledge in several ways. First, our findings 
confirm that indeed, there are significantly higher trading activities after STBL 
implementation, which is aligned with the claim made by KLSE (Bursa Malaysia, 2003). 
Second, our study enriches the scarce literature on the minimum trading unit. Our findings 
show that lot size reduction in Malaysia is associated with greater trading volumes, which is 
consistent with the previous studies (Ahn et al., 2014; Amihud et al., 1999; Gozluklu et al., 
2015). Third, the outcome of our study can be used as a reference for the regulators in 
evaluating the effectiveness of current policies or formulating future regulations to 
strengthen and enhance the good organization of the Malaysian equity market. 
This paper is organized as follow. Section 2 presents a review of the literature followed 
by Section 3 that outlines the research design and data, while Section 4 discusses the 
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2. Literature Review 
Only limited number of empirical literatures that specifically discusses the effect of lot size 
changes on liquidity (see for example, Ahn, 2014, Ahn et al., 2014, Amihud et al., 1999), 
Gozluklu et al., 2015, Hauser and Lauterbach, 2003, Isaka, 2014, and Isaka and Yoshikawa, 
2013). Studies on lot size changes commonly use the investor base hypothesis proposed by 
Merton (1987) to explain the reaction observed. Merton (1987) introduces a model 
suggesting that firms with a higher number of investors have more information availability. 
He assumes that investors would only add securities that they have access to the information 
into their portfolio. This leads to a lower level of information asymmetry, and thus, the 
lower cost of capital and higher market value. Due to these potential benefits, managers 
have the motivation to expand their firm's investor base. Merton (1987) also suggests that 
the effect is greater in lesser-known firms and firms with higher firm-specific risk. 
Amihud et al. (1999) study the event of lot size reduction in the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
(TSE) over the 1991-1996 period. They find stocks that reduced their lot size have greater 
trading volume, driven by the more dispersed ownership structure (i.e. greater investor 
base). Even though the smaller lot size increases the percentage of noise traders (i.e. small, 
individual investors), this also leads to greater liquidity and higher stock values. However, 
these firms might also suffer from greater agency cost and poorer corporate governance. 
In addition, Ahn et al. (2014) use intraday trade and quote data from 1996 to 2005 to 
determine the effect of lot size reduction in the TSE. The higher frequency dataset allows 
them to analyze aspects of liquidity and market dynamics which could not be addressed 
using daily data. Their evidence shows that even though the lots size reduction widens the 
investor bases through the increased influx of individual, noisy traders, it could be 
detrimental to stock price informativeness. However, this is countered by the more 
aggressive trading by informed traders, leading to lower bid-ask spreads, which in turn, 
increases the market value of the firms. 
In another market, Hauser and Lauterbach (2003) examine the event of lot size changes 
in the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, which see an increase of lot size by 33% on September 1, 
1998, and reduction of lot size by 62%-81% on December 1, 1999. Their results show that 
the decrease in lot size promotes trading activities and stock value, which is consistent with 
the model proposed by Merton (1987). However, this result is not uniform across all stocks. 
Stocks with greater initial tradability will benefit more, while those that suffer from the thin 
trading problem will gain less, or even worsened following the lot size reduction. 
Similarly, Isaka and Yoshikawa (2013) also find that the positive effect from lot size 
reduction varied across stocks in the TSE – it is more pronounced in low-visibility firms and 
less noticeable in high-visibility firms. This relationship holds despite using different 
measures of liquidity. They suggest that a firm’s cost of capital and value may be affected 
by investors' degree of familiarity with its stock, hence the asymmetry reaction. Gozluklu et 
al. (2015) investigate the effect of reducing lot size in Borsa Italiana from multiple sizes to 
one unit per lot. They find improvement in the market liquidity after the reduction, indicated 
by a decrease in the bid-ask spread at the first five levels of the order book. Conversely, 
Isaka (2014) find that firm liquidity does not change significantly following lot size 
reductions. He concludes that the expanded investor base does not affect returns through 
any changes in liquidity, but only influences the long-run stock returns.  
In general, empirical studies on lot size find the reduction in the minimum trading unit 
widens the investor base from the increased proportion of small individual traders. This 
leads to greater information availability, which increases both liquidity and stock values 
(Verousis et al., 2018). From the literature, we hypothesize that liquidity is significantly 
affected by the STBL event. 
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Sample Selection 
Our sample comprises firms affected by the standardization event in 2003 that are collected 
from four different dates; (1) February 5 (Announcement date), (2) April 7 (the first stage of 
implementation), (3) April 28 (the second stage of implementation), and (4) May 26 (the 
third and final stage of implementation). The first announcement of the event was made by 
Datuk Mohd Azlan Hashim, the executive chairman of KLSE back then, on Friday, January 
31, 2003. On the announcement day, the market was closed and remained closed for five 
consecutive days starting from January 31 (Friday) until February 4 (Tuesday) due to a long 
weekend. The market resumed trading on February 5 (Wednesday). 
Since the first announcement was made on a non-trading day, February 5 is taken as the 
event day (Day 0), which is the next-available trading day after the long holiday. There were 
1,120 counters listed on KLSE across all trading boards on that day, of which 871 are 
unique firms and 249 are derivative securities. The latter are excluded since the focus of our 
study is the main firms. Another two firms are excluded due to insufficient data, resulting in 
869 firms in the final sample. 
In addition, we investigate the implementation effect of SBTL on the market. The 
implementation process was completed in three stages across three different dates, affecting 
one exclusive group of stocks at a time. The first stage affected 289 firms listed on the 
Second Board of KLSE, while the second stage affected 106 Trading/Services stocks listed 
on the Main Board. The final stage of the implementation affected the remaining 474 firms 
on KLSE. The chronology of STBL and final sample used in our study are summarized in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Sample for the STBL event 
Event Date (Day 0) Affected firms 
Number 
of firms 
5 February 2003 (Announcement day) Firms listed on KLSE 869 
7 April 2003 (First stage) Firms listed on the Second Board 289 
28 April 2003 (Second stage) Firms listed on the Trading/Services sector of 
the Main Board 
106 
26 May 2003 (Third stage) Remaining firms of the Main Board 474 
Notes: The figures stated in the table are based on the number of firms involved in the standardization event, 
represents the main counter of a firm and excludes any derivative securities. The figures also exclude all 
MESDAQ firms, and firms in the financial and utilities industries. 
                                                                                                                   
These implementation dates are utilized as another set of events which allows us to 
compare the liquidity reaction surrounding the announcement day and the implementation 
days. In this study, we use three measurements of liquidity: (1) volume turnover (see for 
example; Datar et al., 1998; Chordia et al., 2001). (2) bid-ask spread (see for example; 
Amihud and Mendelson, 2006; Lesmond, 2005) and (3) Amihud illiquidity ratio (see for 
example; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Amihud and Mendelson, 2006) 
For brevity in explaining the methodology, we use the term liquidity to represent these 
measures. The formulas and descriptions for each measure are presented in Table 2.We use 
an event study methodology to determine the liquidity reaction surrounding the events of 
interest. The event days are labeled as Day 0, which are February 5 (announcement), April 7 
(first stage), April 28 (second stage), and May 26 (third stage). 
This study emphasizes on the results of short event windows surrounding the event day 
to avoid capturing effect, if any from other liquidity-sensitive event. In addition, it would be 
more accurate to deduce that the reaction observed within these windows is linked to the 
STBL event. Our longest event window is set at 21 days, which starts 10 days prior to the 
event day to 10 days after (-10, +10). In addition, we also use other event windows such as 5 
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days prior to 5 days after (-5,+5), 3 days prior to 3 days after (-3,+3), 1-day surrounding the 
event day (-1,+1), the event day to 3 days after (0,+3), the event day to 5 days after (0,+5), 
10 days prior to the event day (-10,-1), the event day and the first day after (0,+1), and 2 
days after until 10 days after (+2,+10).  
 
Table 2: Variables and measurements 
Variables Measurements 
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 Volume turnover (in percentage) of firm i on day t. It is used to proxy for liquidity from 
the trading activity perspective. It measures how frequent firm i shares being traded on 
day t, relative to its number of common shares outstanding on the same day. Larger values 
indicate greater liquidity. 
 
            𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 (%) =
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 (𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡)
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 (𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡)
                                             (1) 
 
𝑆𝑃𝑅𝑖,𝑡  Bid-ask spread of firm i on day t. It is used to proxy for liquidity from the information 
asymmetry perspective. It measures the gap (in percentage) between the lowest selling 
price (ask) and the highest buying price (bid) of firm i shares at closing time on day t. 
Smaller values indicate greater liquidity. 
 
                                     𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡−𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡
                                                                (2) 
 
𝐼𝐿𝑄𝑖,𝑡  Amihud illiquidity ratio of firm i on day t. It is used to proxy for liquidity from the price 
impact perspective. It measures how much the share price of firm i will be impacted by 
every ringgit of its shares traded on day t. Smaller values indicate greater liquidity. 
 






                                           (3) 
 
 
Since the emphasis is on short event window, referring to Chae (2005), our estimation 
window is set from 40 days to 11 days prior to each event day (-40, -11). To calculate the 
normal liquidity, we use the mean-adjusted model. The normal liquidity (𝐿𝐼𝑄̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑖) is estimated 
for each stock by finding the average value of each measure from the estimation window. 
The normal liquidity is then used to calculate the daily abnormal liquidity in the event 
window. The formulas to compute normal and abnormal liquidity are presented in equation 
4 and equation 5 respectively. 
 





𝑡=−11                       (4) 
 
𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐿𝐼𝑄̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑖                    (5) 
 
where, 
𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡    = abnormal liquidity of firm i on day t 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡    = liquidity of firm i on day t 
n    = number of observations of liquidity of firm i from day -40 to day -11 
 
Next, we calculate the average abnormal liquidity of all firms on day t (𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡) and the 







𝑖=1                     (6) 
 






∑ (𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡)
2𝑛
𝑖=1                                (7) 
 
where n is the number of observations of abnormal liquidity of all firms on day t. We then 
calculate the cumulative average abnormal liquidity (𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡) of all firms from day t1 
until t2. Lastly, we compute the variance of cumulative average abnormal liquidity of all 
firms from day t1 until t2 (𝑉𝑎𝑟𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑄(𝑡1,𝑡2)). 
 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑄(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1





∑ (𝐶𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡1,𝑡2 − 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑄(𝑡1, 𝑡2))
2
𝑛
𝑖=1                 (9) 
 
where, 
𝐶𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡1 ,𝑡2  = cumulative abnormal liquidity of firm i from day 𝑡1 until 𝑡2 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑄(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = cumulative average abnormal liquidity of all firms from day 𝑡1 until 𝑡2 
𝑛 = number of observations of cumulative abnormal liquidity from day 𝑡1  
until 𝑡2 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
This section discusses the effect of standardization events on liquidity by analyzing the 
average abnormal liquidity (AALIQ) and cumulative average abnormal liquidity (CAALIQ) 
surrounding the event days. Liquidity is measured using volume turnover (VOL), bid-ask 
spread (SPR) and Amihud illiquidity ratio (ILQ). Therefore, the abbreviations used to 
discuss the results are tailored accordingly.  
 
4.1 STBL Announcement 
Table 3 presents the results of abnormal liquidity and cumulative abnormal liquidity for the 
liquidity measures over a 21-day period surrounding the announcement day. Our findings 
show that there is a significant increase in trading activities over this period (CAAVOL-
10,+10=0.0060). We further dissect the event window into three smaller windows to capture 
the pre-event [-10,-1], on event day [0,+1], and post-event [+2,+10] effects. We find 
significant improvements in volume turnover and bid-ask spread in the pre-event period, 
indicated by CAAVOL-10,-1=0.0082 and CAASPR-10,-1=-0.0450, respectively. Regardless, 
volume turnover has decreased significantly on the event day (CAAVOL0,+1=-0.0005) and 
post-event (CAAVOL+2,+10=-0.0017), signifying lower trading activities following the 
announcement. Results remain consistent even when liquidity is measured using bid-ask 
spread and Amihud illiquidity. Both suggest significant deterioration in liquidity on the 
event day (CAASPR0,+1=0.0116) and post-event (CAAILQ+2,+10=0.0313) periods.  
Figure 1 confirms that there is a negative trend after the announcement day (Day 0) 
across all measures. This is illustrated by the decreasing trend in CAAVOL and an 
increasing trend in both CAASPR and CAAILQ. This phenomenon can be explained using 
the lack of information arguments. On the announcement date itself, the market does not 
have sufficient information about STBL such as when and how the standardization would be 
implemented. This situation constraints investors from making informed decisions and 
forcing them to shy away from the market, which is shown by the negative CAAVOL from 
Day 0 onwards. In addition, this has heightened the level of uncertainties in the market, a 
reflected by the greater level of information asymmetry (bid-ask spread) and price impact 
(Amihud illiquidity) in the post-event period. 
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Table 3: Abnormal liquidity surrounding the announcement day 
Panel A: Event day 
Event day Date     n  AAVOL    n  AASPR    n  AAILQ 
-10 17/01/2003 670 -0.0013*** 742 -0.0081*** 497 -0.0009 
-9 20/01/2003 656 -0.0012*** 738 -0.0080*** 481 -0.0024** 
-8 21/01/2003 704 -0.0020*** 736 -0.0136*** 567 -0.0065*** 
-7 22/01/2003 703 -0.0019*** 747 -0.0132*** 554 -0.0078*** 
-6 23/01/2003 650 -0.0009*** 742 -0.0102*** 532 -0.0061*** 
-5 24/01/2003 659 -0.0005*** 738 -0.0061*** 543 -0.0040*** 
-4 27/01/2003 645 -0.0003*** 744 -0.0036** 580 -0.0207 
-3 28/01/2003 635 -0.0007*** 740 -0.0006 534 -0.0024** 
-2 29/01/2003 611 -0.0004* 737 -0.0043*** 476 -0.0015 
-1 30/01/2003 594 -0.0000 729 -0.0038** 426 -0.0257 
-0 5/02/2003 570 -0.0005*** 746 -0.0085*** 411 -0.0001 
-1 6/02/2003 601 -0.0001 740 -0.0033** 440 -0.0010 
-2 7/02/2003 610 -0.0002 736 -0.0002 456 -0.0133 
-3 10/02/2003 637 -0.0003** 737 -0.0052*** 503 -0.0267 
-4 11/02/2003 600 -0.0005*** 744 -0.0022 421 -0.0006 
-5 13/02/2003 605 -0.0005*** 743 -0.0046*** 443 -0.0043 
-6 14/02/2003 598 -0.0005** 732 -0.0018 412 -0.0034 
-7 17/02/2003 601 -0.0000 735 -0.0030** 461 -0.0006 
-8 18/02/2003 587 -0.0002* 730 -0.0010 405 -0.0008 
-9 19/02/2003 606 -0.0002 735 -0.0033*** 408 -0.0017 
10 20/02/2003 591 -0.0003 742 -0.0034*** 414 -0.0007 
Panel B: Event windows 
Event windows CAAVOL  CAASPR CAAILQ 
(-10, +10) -0.0060***  -0.0249 -0.0379 
(-5, +5) -0.0002  -0.0290*** -0.0533 
(-3, +3) -0.0001  -0.0250*** -0.0388 
(-1, +1) -0.0005  -0.0152*** -0.0168 
(0, +1) -0.0005**  -0.0116*** -0.0007 
(-10, -1) -0.0082***  -0.0450*** -0.0079 
(+2, +10) -0.0017*  -0.0088 -0.0313** 
(0, +3) -0.0010**  -0.0167*** -0.0276* 
(0, +5) -0.0018**  -0.0232*** -0.0293* 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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4.2 STBL implementation 
4.2.1 First Stage 
Table 4 shows the results of abnormal liquidity surrounding the first stage, which affected 
firms listed on the Second Board. The results show that there is a significant increase in the 
trading volume surrounding the event day (CAAVOL0,+1=0.0019) and the shorter post-event 
windows (CAAVOL0,+3=0.0025; CAAVOL0,+5=0.0032). This is illustrated by the steady 
increase in CAAVOL after Day 0 depicted in Figure 2. The bid-ask spread surrounding the 
first stage shows that the result is significantly positive only for the pre-event window 
(CAASPR-10,-1=0.0636), followed by a sideways movement from Day -2 onwards. As for 
the Amihud illiquidity ratio, the pre-event and event day windows are not significant. 
However, the overall and post-event windows are significantly positive, as indicated by 
CAAILQ-10,+10=0.0898 and CAAILQ+2,+10=0.0648, respectively. This is illustrated by the 
sharp increase in CAAILQ from Day 0 onwards (see Figure 2). 
 
Table 4: Abnormal liquidity surrounding the first stage 
Panel A: Event day 
Event day Date     n  AAVOL    n  AASPR    n AAILQ 
-10 24/03/2003 164 -0.0002 240 -0.0086*** 125 -0.0328 
-9 25/03/2003 134 -0.0005 239 -0.0096*** 102 -0.0002 
-8 26/03/2003 152 -0.0001 243 -0.0082*** 108 -0.0066 
-7 27/03/2003 134 -0.0005 237 -0.0081** 97 -0.0023 
-6 28/03/2003 142 -0.0005* 240 -0.0067** 105 -0.0075* 
-5 31/03/2003 157 -0.0003 240 -0.0102*** 115 -0.0001 
-4 1/04/2003 148 -0.0004* 242 -0.0122*** 105 -0.0016 
-3 2/04/2003 153 -0.0000 240 -0.0040 104 -0.0024 
-2 3/04/2003 170 -0.0003 240 -0.0025 118 -0.0053 
-1 4/04/2003 170 -0.0004 239 -0.0004 120 -0.0067* 
-0 7/04/2003 179 -0.0009* 234 -0.0071** 152 -0.0043 
-1 8/04/2003 182 -0.0014*** 239 -0.0057** 146 -0.0243 
-2 9/04/2003 176 -0.0005 239 -0.0012 135 -0.0457* 
-3 10/04/2003 170 -0.0004 234 -0.0002 116 -0.0002 
-4 11/04/2003 161 -0.0005 238 -0.0008 114 -0.0070 
-5 14/04/2003 157 -0.0004 242 -0.0060* 128 -0.0145 
-6 15/04/2003 164 -0.0004 242 -0.0005 125 -0.0216 
-7 16/04/2003 177 -0.0004 240 -0.0017 127 -0.0051 
-8 17/04/2003 173 -0.0003 241 -0.0058* 120 -0.0053 
-9 18/04/2003 171 -0.0003 239 -0.0055* 106 -0.0228 
10 21/04/2003 155 -0.0001 243 -0.0000 105 -0.0031 
Panel B: Event windows 
Event windows CAAVOL  CAASPR CAAILQ 
(-10, +10) -0.0033  -0.0601 0.0898*** 
(-5, +5) -0.0031  -0.0325 0.0490* 
(-3, +3) -0.0029*  -0.0041 0.0379 
(-1, +1) -0.0020**  -0.0016 0.0162 
(0, +1) -0.0019***  -0.0012 0.0217 
(-10, -1) -0.0009  -0.0636*** 0.0119 
(+2, +10) -0.0025  -0.0044 0.0648** 
(0, +3) -0.0025**  -0.0022 0.0481* 
(0, +5) -0.0032**  -0.0088 0.0579** 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
Our results suggest that there are greater trading activities among the affected firms in 
the post-event period. Regardless, the implementation also sees a higher level of 
information asymmetry and greater price impact for the Second Board stocks after the lot 
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size reduction. Our results suggest that STBL implementation has put the affected stocks in 
the spotlight – the center of attraction in the market. The fact that this event is something 
that has never been done before in the market, the surprise factor (i.e. investors’ 
anticipation) over the impact of the new policy is stronger. This is reflected by the 
significantly higher trading activity especially in the first few days after the implementation 
took place. This also explains the wider bid-ask spread in the pre-event period, suggesting a 
more diverse opinion in the market. The significant positive post-event CAAILQ suggest 
that despite the higher trading activity recorded, investors would participate only when the 
price movement is large enough – as reflected by the absolute value of return in the Amihud 
illiquidity measure. This is consistent with the risk-return trade-off theory which suggests 
that investors would require greater return for the greater risk they have to bear, which in 
this case are the speculative stocks. 
 
 
Figure 2: The cumulative average abnormal liquidity over a 21-day period surrounding the first stage 
 
4.2.2 Second Stage 
Table 5 shows the results of abnormal liquidity surrounding the second stage that affected 
firms listed on the Trading/Services sector of the Main Board. In general, Trading/Services 
firms are larger, more expensive, and highly liquid. Our results show that there is a negative 
trend in the trading activities from Day -10 until Day -3, followed by a positive trend from 
Day +2 onwards and then nullified the effect observed from the preceding trend (see Figure 
3). This also explains why none of our selected event windows on CAAVOL report a 
significant result. On the contrary, all windows show significant negative CAASPR, 
indicating greater liquidity and lesser information asymmetry problem for the 
Trading/Services stocks after STBL implementation. This is evident by the consistent 
negative trend from Day -10 to Day +10 shown in Figure 3.  
As for the Amihud illiquidity ratio, even though there is a positive shift in illiquidity 
from Day 0 until Day +1, it is not statistically significant, and neither do any of the event 
windows tested. In short, there is no significant difference in trading activity and illiquidity 
surrounding the second stage. This might be due to the fundamental characteristics of stocks 
in the Trading/Services sector itself, which inherently have higher trading activity and are 
less illiquid than the rest of the market. Regardless, there is a significant reduction in bid-ask 
spread surrounding the affected stocks, suggesting a smaller level of information 
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Table 5: Abnormal liquidity surrounding the second stage 
Panel A: Event day 
Event day     Date     n  AAVOL    n  AASPR    n AAILQ 
-10 14/04/2003 85 -0.0002** 95 -0.0011 47 -0.0009 
-9 15/04/2003 89 -0.0002** 97 -0.0044** 63 -0.0010 
-8 16/04/2003 85 -0.0002*** 100 -0.0034** 57 -0.0005 
-7 17/04/2003 87 -0.0002** 97 -0.0014 51 -0.0003 
-6 18/04/2003 86 -0.0001 95 -0.0059*** 59 -0.0003 
-5 21/04/2003 83 -0.0001 96 -0.0026 53 -0.0010 
-4 22/04/2003 83 -0.0002** 96 -0.0038* 48 -0.0003 
-3 23/04/2003 92 -0.0001 98 -0.0031 63 -0.0010** 
-2 24/04/2003 88 -0.0005 95 -0.0046** 67 -0.0005 
-1 25/04/2003 88 -0.0001 97 -0.0015 51 -0.0007* 
-0 28/04/2003 83 -0.0001 97 -0.0075*** 54 -0.0004 
-1 29/04/2003 91 -0.0001 92 -0.0069*** 62 -0.0150 
-2 30/04/2003 88 -0.0004 97 -0.0037 57 -0.0032 
-3 2/05/2003 83 -0.0000 96 -0.0035 53 -0.0002 
-4 5/05/2003 92 -0.0000 98 -0.0047** 61 -0.0011 
-5 6/05/2003 91 -0.0001 92 -0.0048** 59 -0.0004 
-6 7/05/2003 92 -0.0000 94 -0.0004 52 -0.0013** 
-7 8/05/2003 87 -0.0002 96 -0.0022 52 -0.0000 
-8 9/05/2003 87 -0.0000 96 -0.0059** 53 -0.0026 
-9 12/05/2003 90 -0.0000 94 -0.0052** 62 -0.0010** 
10 13/05/2003 90 -0.0001 91 -0.0053** 66 -0.0006 
Panel B: Event windows 
  Event windows CAAVOL  CAASPR CAAILQ 
(-10, +10) -0.0003  -0.0710*** -0.0091 
(-5, +5) -0.0006  -0.0433*** -0.0082 
(-3, +3) -0.0007  -0.0286*** -0.0100 
(-1, +1) -0.0001  -0.0151*** -0.0109 
(0, +1) -0.0000  -0.0138*** -0.0125 
(-10, -1) -0.0007  -0.0250* -0.0015 
(+2, +10) -0.0004  -0.0330*** -0.0013 
(0, +3) -0.0003  -0.0204*** -0.0121 
(0, +5) -0.0004  -0.0290*** -0.0103 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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to participate in these stocks, which previously might be too costly. Consequently, their 
private information is impounded in the stock price through their trading activities, which 
accordingly caused the bid-ask spreads to shrink. 
 
4.2.3 Third Stage 
Table 6 shows the results of abnormal liquidity surrounding the third stage. This is also the 
last and final stage of the implementation, affecting the remaining firms listed on the Main 
Board of KLSE. The third stage also hosted the largest number of affected stocks – 474 
firms across various industries. 
 
Table 6: Abnormal liquidity surrounding the third stage 
Panel A: Event day 
Event day          Date     n  AAVOL    n  AASPR    n AAILQ 
-10 8/05/2003 344 -0.0001 413 -0.0030** 196 -0.0136 
-9 9/05/2003 360 -0.0002 402 -0.0018 223 -0.0030* 
-8 12/05/2003 363 -0.0000 406 -0.0026* 234 -0.0099 
-7 13/05/2003 366 -0.0001 402 -0.0051*** 237 -0.0142* 
-6 16/05/2003 368 -0.0000 401 -0.0022 256 -0.0200 
-5 19/05/2003 368 -0.0003** 403 -0.0032* 254 -0.0097 
-4 20/05/2003 367 -0.0002* 404 -0.0044*** 227 -0.0247* 
-3 21/05/2003 367 -0.0002* 400 -0.0030 233 -0.0035 
-2 22/05/2003 362 -0.0000 405 -0.0038* 244 -0.0211* 
-1 23/05/2003 386 -0.0010*** 403 -0.0054*** 315 -0.0011 
-0 26/05/2003 394 -0.0009*** 403 -0.0095*** 301 -0.0176* 
-1 27/05/2003 385 -0.0004*** 402 -0.0071*** 284 -0.0096* 
-2 28/05/2003 399 -0.0009*** 401 -0.0096*** 334 -0.0100 
-3 29/05/2003 392 -0.0009*** 399 -0.0116*** 291 -0.0006 
-4 30/05/2003 404 -0.0013*** 403 -0.0112*** 309 -0.0245** 
-5 2/06/2003 385 -0.0005*** 395 -0.0090*** 287 -0.0139 
-6 3/06/2003 396 -0.0008*** 405 -0.0100*** 277 -0.0130 
-7 4/06/2003 384 -0.0006*** 398 -0.0093*** 265 -0.0281* 
-8 5/06/2003 406 -0.0016*** 397 -0.0107*** 357 -0.0150* 
-9 6/06/2003 406 -0.0009*** 408 -0.0111*** 281 -0.0213* 
10 9/06/2003 409 -0.0022*** 401 -0.0161*** 342 -0.0255** 
Panel B: Event windows 
Event windows CAAVOL  CAASPR CAAILQ 
(-10, +10) 0.0121***  -0.1401*** -0.1813** 
(-5, +5) 0.0062***  -0.0730*** -0.0759** 
(-3, +3) 0.0040***  -0.0471*** -0.0414** 
(-1, +1) 0.0021***  -0.0211*** -0.0211** 
(0, +1) 0.0012***  -0.0162*** -0.0220** 
(-10, -1) 0.0016***  -0.0326*** -0.0559** 
(+2, +10) 0.0092***  -0.0923*** -0.1075** 
(0, +3) 0.0030***  -0.0359*** -0.0270* 
(0, +5) 0.0047***  -0.0545*** -0.0540** 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
STBL implementation occurs in multiple stages over a short period of time – only 49 
calendar days from the first stage to the completion of the final stage. This design allows 
investors to observe the market reaction in the earlier stages and strategize accordingly. The 
positive liquidity effects observed surrounding the earlier implementation stages (i.e. greater 
trading volume and narrower spread in the first and second stage respectively) would lead 
investors to deduce similar trend would be seen in the third stage. Therefore, they would 
positively anticipate that the affected stock will soon enjoy greater liquidity. Since liquidity 
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is priced, investors are motivated to enter the market several days prior to the event day to 
gain strategic positions. 
 
 
Figure 4: The cumulative average abnormal liquidity over a 21-day period surrounding the third stage 
 
The results show that there is a significant improvement in liquidity in all three measures 
and across the event windows that we used. We find that the positive trend of AAVOL has 
started from Day -5, which is one whole week prior to the actual implementation date (see 
Figure 4). This indicates that the trading activities are abnormally high even before the lot 
size is reduced, which confirms with the strategic trading notion. In addition, most of the 
daily AASPR and AAILQ are significantly negative in the 21-day event window even in the 
pre-event days (see Table 6). This is also confirmed by the distinct trends shown in Figure 
4, which illustrates a consistently negative trend for both CAASPR and CAAILQ starting 
from Day -10 until Day +10. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the effects of STBL announcement and implementation in 2003 on the 
liquidity of Malaysian listed stocks using three different liquidity proxies – volume 
turnover, bid-ask spread, and Amihud illiquidity ratio. Our paper generally contributes to 
the literature on market microstructure by examining the impact of introducing an 
exogenous shock to improve liquidity in an emerging stock market. The new policy affects 
all firms listed on the KLSE, excluding the MESDAQ counters. Specifically, our research 
enriches the literature on lot size reduction by analyzing the liquidity reaction following the 
STBL implementation. 
We find a significant deterioration in all three measures of liquidity following the 
announcement of STBL. We believe this is due to the lack of information provided during 
the announcement, which inhibits investors from making an informed trading decision. This 
is reflected by the significantly lower trading volume, wider spreads, and higher illiquidity 
surrounding the STBL announcement. As for the implementation stages, we find that 
trading volume is significantly positive in the first stage, and the bid-ask spread is 
significantly reduced in the second stage. During the third stage, we find significant 
improvement in all three liquidity measures, which is believed to be driven by the positive 
market expectation. We also find evidence of strategic trading in the third stage, as indicated 
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Overall, our findings are consistent with the claim made by Bursa Malaysia (2003) that 
the trading activities have increased significantly after the implementation of STBL. 
However, the results are less pronounced for stocks that are already actively traded. In 
addition, our results using other liquidity measures show that the KLSE’s objective to add 
liquidity to the stock market via the lot size reduction is realized. For future studies, we 
suggest using a longer horizon to compare whether the positive liquidity reaction observed 
following the lot size reduction is permanent. In addition, it is also worth to investigate 
whether the effect of lot size reduction is driven by firm-specific characteristics. Future 
researchers could also conduct a comparative analysis by examining the market reaction 
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